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From a series of qualitative interviews with Japanese managers and German managers and
workers in thirty-one Japanese-owned companies in the Dusseldorf region of western Germany,
this article discusses differences in cultural patterns and organizational styles between the
German and Japanese employees and the problems these pose for communication, cooperation,
and morale. First, we deal with cultural contrasts: language issues, interpersonal styles
(personability and politeness), and norms regarding the taking of responsibility. Second, we
examine the impact on cross-nationality relations of established organizational practice: for
example, German specialism vs. Japanese generalism; direct and vertical vs. indirect and
incremental decision making. We also discuss efforts by these firms to find compromise systems
that would meet the needs and interests of both sides. The third focus is the reactions of Japanese
companies in North Rhine-Westphalia to German unions, works councils, and codetermination
regulations. In the labor view, Japanese firms overall do no better or worse than comparable
German firms.

Japanese direct investment in Western economies is concentrated in North America and
the United Kingdom. In consequence, a rich journalistic and scholarly literature examines the
Japanese experience in the Anglo-American countries, the management styles and organization
structures of the subsidiaries, and the relations between the Japanese management and the local
workforce (see, e.g., Milkman, 1991; Lincoln, Olson, and Hanada, 1978; Pucik, Hanada, and
Fifield, 1989; Florida and Kenney, 1992; Oliver and Wilkinson, 1990). There is far less writing,

particularly in English, on the activities of Japanese companies elsewhere in the West. Yet the
Japanese corporate presence in continental Europe is already substantial and will almost certainly
grow as the European Union and the GAlT erode regulatory and other national barriers to foreign
investment and trade.
The topic of this paper is Japanese firms in Germany: primarily, the contrasts in culture
and management style that German and Japanese employees of such firms encounter daily in
their experiences on the job. Our observations come from a set of interviews conducted in 199293 with Japanese and German managers in the Diisseldorf area, the region of Germany with the
highest concentration of Japanese business, and, after London, the leading center of Japanese
corporate activity in Europe. Moreover, while our Diisseldorf informants no doubt have their
biases, they expressed confidence that, owing to its central location in continental Western
Europe and easy access to the East, Dusseldorf would someday overtake London as the premier
locus of Japanese business activity in Europe.
Moreover, Germany-North Rhine-Westphalia, in particular-presents a valuable
opportunity for research on such questions because of its substantial Japanese business activity.
In 1990, Japan, at 5 billion DM, was second only to the United States and the Netherlands in
direct investment in the region, this accounting for half the total Japanese investment. Germany
was second only to the United Kingdom in the number of resident Japanese in Europe. Forty-five
percent of the German-resident Japanese population lives in North Rhine-Westphalia, with
almost 8,000 in Diisseldorf alone. A 1991 survey by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in
Diisseldorf found 75,000 Germans employed by 1,099 Japanese corporations in Germany, with
more than 100 billion DM in profits in Germany. As a set, then, Japanese corporations have the
same weight in the German economy as does Daimler-Benz.

Our information on Japanese-owned companies in Germany comes from a series of
qualitative interviews with Japanese managers, German managers, works council members, and
labor leaders in the Dusseldorf area. We surveyed thirty-one Japanese-owned firms in a diverse
mix of industries. The interviews were open-ended: we posed a series of broad questions
regarding the management and industrial relations and how they were viewed by both German
and Japanese employees (see Kerbo, Wittenhagen, and Nakao, 1994a, 1994b). Additional
interviews were conducted with all works council members in six of the companies. In all such
interviews, we solicited impressions and details on the relations between Japanese company
officials and their German employees. We asked the Germans to contrast their Japanese
employer with German companies they had worked for in the past. In a number of firms, the
Japanese managers we interviewed had experience in the United States and elsewhere in Europe.
Finally, we interviewed labor union officials regarding union and works council activities among
the Japanese companies of Dusseldorf.
The list of corporations from which we selected was provided by the Japanische
Industrie-und Handelskammer zu Diisseldorf, which identified all the Japanese corporations
and their top management personnel for the year 1992. The thirty-one companies included three
financial services firms, seven large trading companies, one engineering firm, two heavy
manufacturing firms doing marketing research in Germany, and eighteen other manufacturing
corporations. Of the eighteen manufacturers, only seven had production facilities in Germany,
the activities of the remainder being limited to sales, service, and R & D. We attempted in every
organization to interview the highest level Japanese and German managers, either together or
separately. However, in a relatively small number of firms, our contacts were exclusively from

one group or the other. The works council interviews were conducted exclusively with Germans
and with no managers of either nationality present.
The article is broadly exploratory and somewhat normative in tone, not hypothesis testing
in the conventional sense. Our concerns are with how sociocultural differences combine with
organizational styles to complicate the working relationships between Japanese and German
employees. Some contrasts in how the Japanese and Germans approach organizational life are
deep-rooted in societal values and customs; others reflect the institutionalized practices of the
Japanese or German firm. Both complicate cross-nationality relations in the workplace but the
institutional contrasts are, in a sense, less fundamental and more amenable to adjustments that
allow for common ground.
German economic organization, corporate structure, and management practice bear
strong resemblance to patterns in Japan. Yet in other respects, the Germans and the Japanese
seem poles apart. How these similarities and differences shape the relations between German and
Japanese employees within the Japanese-owned company and, consequently, its success and
viability are the subject of our inquiry.

Social and Cultural Barriers

The Japanese of Diisseldorf The Diisseldorf community of Japanese residents is the oldest in
Europe. Its origins trace to the business ties which Japanese steel and trading companies forged
with German heavy industry in the Ruhr region. The tight-knit Japanese Dusseldorf enclave, like
that of Scarsdale, New York, and other Western residential concentrations of Japanese expatriate
families, provides all the services, facilities, and social supports that Japanese managers and their

families require to maintain a Japanese life-style during a German tour of duty. Stores and
restaurants offer Japanese foodstuffs, clothing, and home furnishings; enclave schools enable
expatriate children to pursue a Japanese education undisrupted by an overseas stay; cultural
activities (music, art, classes in flower arranging, tea ceremony) preserve Japanese cultural
ambience and provide outlets for the interests of Japanese managers’ wives; clubs, associations,
and neighbors offer a supportive network of acquaintances and friends.
This self-contained expatriate society offers real benefits to the rotating Japanese
managers in the North Rhine subsidiaries of Japanese firms. It permits assignment to the region
with less shock to family life than the typical Japanese corporate transfer occasions. Yet the
negatives are prominent as well. Insulated from real exposure to German society beyond their
encounters in the firm, the average expatriate Japanese learns far less from his German tour of
duty than he otherwise might, even though the benefits of a globalizing experience were
probably a factor in the parent company’s decision to dispatch him abroad in the first place.1
Moreover, the size and isolation of the Dusseldorf enclave feed suspicions on the German side
that the Japanese are by nature clannish and reclusive. By the same token and combined with the
recent epidemic of antiforeigner sentiment in Germany, the lack of real exposure to German
society and culture exacerbates Japanese anxieties over German racial prejudice, although the
Diisseldorf Japanese have by and large escaped harassment by German right-wing groups.
The problem of English. Peculiar as it may seem that English is the language of the workplace
among Japanese firms in Germany, the reasons are clear: (1) the same firms are involved in other

1.

Indeed, one of the criticisms often leveled at the Japanese practice of rotating expatriate staff through the
foreign subsidiary is that, by exposing a large number of career managers to a relatively brief
international experience, the overseas assignment benefits the honsha (parent) much more than the
subsidiary.

European countries and North America as well; (2) all university-educated Japanese have
substantial English training albeit highly uneven practical proficiency; and (3) most Germanbased Japanese corporations have employees who are neither Japanese nor German. Indeed,
several of our companies had citizens from more than a dozen nations working in Dusseldorf.

A sizable literature on Japanese firms in the Anglo-American economies comments on
the communication obstacles and sometime tensions between the local hires and the Japanese
expatriate team. Language figures importantly in the problem: the English spoken by the
Japanese is often mediocre at best, and with rare exceptions the Western staff speak no Japanese
at all. Such problems are aggravated in Germany and elsewhere in continental Europe by the fact
that English is the native language of neither the local nor the expatriate staff. As one manager
observed, “You think you have grasped what the other party was saying but often you have not.”
Still, the Germans hold the linguistic edge: many enjoyed a relaxed facility with English that few
Japanese shared (Lorenz, 1994b). Part of the reserve shown by the Japanese staff about which
our German informants repeatedly complained seems traceable to this. To attempt awkward
English ’and struggle with verbalizing one’s thoughts before a group of German and Japanese
subordinates is humiliating to a proud Japanese manager: far less risky to sit in stony silence or
confine conversation to other Japanese.
Despite the obvious problems of communication posed by the language barrier, it is only
the tip of the iceberg. German-Japanese contrasts in societal as well as organizational culture
likewise present troublesome if interesting obstacles to information flow and understanding.
Such obstacles are more severe in Germany than in the Anglo-American countries simply
because Japanese investments there are narrower in scope and more recent in time. Moreover,

German-language journalistic and scholarly commentary on Japan and Japanese business is to
date far less rich than the extant English-language literature.

Politeness as a cultural norm. An amusing but still consequential contrast in German and
Japanese cultural patterns turns on the issue of politeness. The Japanese are famous for taking
politeness to extremes: the ritual gestures of deference and humility (bowing); the verb endings
and forms of address that vary with the status of the parties and the formality of the occasion; the
frequent insertion in normal speech of apologetic expressions (e.g., surnimasen).2 Moreover, a
distinct offshoot of the Japanese politeness syndrome that time and again confuses gaijin
(foreigners) is a reluctance to say no with clarity, finality, and firmness. The title of Akio Morita
and Shintaro Ishihara’s (1989) provocative book, NO to ieru Nihon (The Japan that Can Say
NO), addresses this tendency. Ironically, the Japanese avoidance of refusal is tied to behavior
that Westerners find disingenuous if not downright rude: a propensity to ignore rather than
acknowledge queries or requests to which the Japanese party prefers not to accede. This sort of
communication problem is widely attributed to the vagueness of the Japanese language and to a
Japanese disdain for blunt, contractual commitments. 3 But its roots also lie with the Japanese
aversion to conflict, particularly of a confrontational, face-to-face sort.4
Germans, in marked contrast, suffer a reputation for being curt, blunt, arrogant, if not, at
times, flat-out rude.5 Germans with whom we spoke acknowledged a shortage of civility within
their ranks, particularly evident in the aloof at best, at worst irritable and surly demeanor of retail
clerks, service workers, and petty bureaucrats. “Service with a scowl,” as the Wall Street

2.

The ultimate in polite forms is keigo, a flowery style in which fewer and fewer young Japanese are
competent. Recently companies have taken it on themselves to school their employees in this form, since it
still finds occasional use in formal business rituals.

Journal recently labeled it (Nelson, 1994), does at times appear to be the German norm. Of
course, some of the rough treatment meted out by lower-level German service workers no doubt
stems from a social democratic aversion to the sort of groveling by service people that is still rife
in Japan.
Yet there is a common thread in German brusqueness and Japanese politeness: distaste
for easy informality early in a relationship. Germans and Japanese are similarly averse to the use
of given names with all but intimates, and both are critical of Americans for their glib
informality and superficial friendliness.
Both cultures, moreover, value deep and lasting relationships in business and politics but
are resistant to forming them with outsiders. The Japanese have a reputation for being hard to get
to know.6 Reasons abound: the scarcity of leisure time; the separation of men’s and women’s
lives; the inadequacy of Japanese homes for entertaining; the separation a collectivist society
imposes on in- and out-group members. The standoffishness of the Japanese was troubling to the
Germans in our study. They saw it as a barrier to genial workplace relations and strong
identification with the Japanese-owned firm. German managers claimed repeated efforts to
socialize with the Japanese staff there were invitations to dinner, sports exhibitions, and other
3. Indeed, the need for greater transparency (romei) in Japanese business and diplomatic relationships
is much discussed in Japan these days (Ozawa, 1994). Part of the reason for former Prime Minister
Morihiro Hosokawa’s extraordinary popularity as a reformist politician was his plain speech that broke
with Japanese tradition and set him apart from run of the mill Japanese politicians.
4. Contrast, for example, the mumbled, tedious, and ritualistic televised speeches and debates of the
Japanese Diet with the sardonic eloquence and sharp personal attacks that are routine fare at the
British House of Commons.
5. Some claim variations by region or land. A colleague from North Rhine-Westphalia suggested that
Hessians (residents of the German state of Hessen) were much more brusque and blunt than was
typical of her area.
6. Perhaps in particular the resident gaijin community in Japan whose complaints on this score daily
fill the letters-to-the-editor page of The Japan Times.

events. Yet the same distant attitude prevailed in the office the following day.7 Even during afterhours drinking outings the barriers remained. One German manager observed that there would be
“Japanese” business from which the Germans were excluded and “other” business in which they
might get involved.
Long-term Japanese residents, however, claimed that in their experience it was the
Germans who were unfriendly and reclusive. Certainly the Japanese were every bit as bothered
by German brusqueness as were the Germans by Japanese aloofness. There were numerous
statements to the effect that: “Germans are too argumentative”; “Germans are too blunt”; and
“Germans will not accept blame for problems.” One Japanese manager did, however, opine that,
while these differences in presentation of self made communication awkward and stressful,
cross-nationality conflict was not the outcome of note. “Oh no,” he said in response to our
question, “almost all the conflict is among the Germans themselves; they are often so rude to
each other.”
The peculiar Japanese charge that “Germans will not accept blame” warrants special
comment. Ritual atonement is an institutionalized conflict resolution device in Japanese society.
The Japanese expect and admire the forthright assumption of guilt, prompt and public mea
culpas, and profuse apology even in situations where Westerners find it unnecessary or
inappropriate. A key role obligation of higher-level managers in the Japanese firm is the
reflexive acceptance of symbolic responsibility for the failures of their divisions or the errors of
subordinates whether the manager’s own actions were in any way implicated or not (Wall Street
Journal, 4 April 1989). It is in contrast rather European (ergo North American) to be direct,
forceful, and “principled.”8 The characteristically Western impulse to defend oneself and shift

the blame to others or cir cumstances strikes the Japanese as an egregious abdication of
management respnsibility.9
Does the politeness mask arrogance? In the late 1980s, a sticking point in cross-cultural
relations in the North American Japanese subsidiary was the apparent arrogance of the Japanese
management team. Convinced of the supremacy of Japanese methods and the caliber of Japanese
personnel, they often bore a superior-to-thou air (Pucik, Hanada, and Fifield, 1989). Such
snobbery fueled the reluctance of Japanese rotating managers to share responsibility with local
staff and involve them in decisions. Asked whether condescension of this sort distinguished the
way in which Japanese managers in Dusseldorf viewed their German compatriots, one German
informant commented that “he hadn’t seen much of that recently.” The burst of the “bubble”
economy, he said, had demolished the myth of Japanese invincibility. More generally, the
postwar strength of the German economy, the quality of German goods, and the skills and
diligence of German labor command a degree of respect from the Japanese that the United
States, Canada, and Britain in recent years have not. Japanese management gives American
executives high marks for commitment, effort, and intelligence. A number of our Japanese
informants had logged time in the United States, and, in their view, German and American peak
management teams differ little in these respects. But farther down the organization-at labor,
7. This view may, however, reflect a misunderstanding of the function of after-hours social events in
Japanese corporate culture. Rather than a mechanism for fostering warm feelings among workmates
the next day, their value is that they provide a limited venue for relaxed, uninhibited conversation and
joking until the inevitable return to the heavy decorum of the daytime Japanese workplace.
8. The American icon of a rugged individualist standing tall for his or her beliefs in the face of
daunting pressures to conform wins few Japanese admirers. Contrast item #5 in the business philosophy
of Konsuke Matsushita, the founder and corporate hero of that strongest of strong culture
Japanese companies, Matsutshita Electric: “Meet what others expect of you! You should discern who
expects what of us and try to meet his expectations. Never cling stubbornly to your stand only!”
(Pascale and Athos, 1981).
9. Of course, in Japanese society the personal risk associated with acceptance of blame is lower than
in the United States or Europe where punitive action by the corporation or even civil and criminal
litigation may be the response to an expansive gesture of this kind. By the same token, failure by a
Japanese manager to take symbolic responsibility is met with strong opprobrium from the tight-knit
business community.

clerical, and lower management levels-the Germans were held in greater esteem.
For historical and cultural reasons, there may also be a latent empathy between the
Germans and the Japanese. Both countries were on the losing side of World War II and, with
massive U.S. assistance, staged miraculous postwar recoveries. Arguably common to both
cultures, moreover, is respect for authority and orderliness and a sometime sense of racial/ethnic
superiority. Finally, in the post-Cold War era, there may be among some Japanese and Germans
a sentiment that, as the world’s second and third largest market economies, their countries should
ally in offsetting the economic and diplomatic/military hegemony of the United States. This, one
manager reported, was the view of his company’s Japanese president, a World War I1 veteran
and avid student of German law and language.
Cosmopolitanism at the top: Are Germans better global managers? If arrogance on the part of
Japanese managers was less a problem in the North Rhine area than it has recently seemed in
North America, that of the local hires-German managers and professionals-may be more so. The
German director of personnel in the subsidiary of a major Japanese trading company (sogo
shosha) commented that Japanese top management in the German branches of Japanese firms
had done previous overseas tours, spoke fluent English, and were truly global managers. But the
second-line Japanese generally had little or no foreign experience, and their facility with English
and general sophistication in things Western were low. Yet their expatriate assignments placed
them above the more experienced and worldly Germans. This caused the latter, he said, to
become haughty and difficult, for they felt superior to the Japanese and resented their lower
standing in the organization. With their multilingual skills and rich backgrounds from working
and living in diverse countries, senior German and other continental European managers pride
themselves on a cosmopolitanism not shared by the provincial Japanese (or North Americans and

British for that matter; see Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Lorenz, 1994b). Another German
manager in our study agreed that European executives do have better global management skills
than do their counterparts elsewhere, something the Japanese sensed, he said, and found
intimidating.

Organization and Management Style

The autonomy of the German branch. Branches of Japanese companies operating in
Germany have less autonomy than in North America. Most are unincorporated under German
law and have yet to acquire experience in the country sufficient to warrant parent-firm
confidence in the local management team. Moreover, German branches of Japanese companies
are typically distributors and offices-not large-scale manufacturing works-hence their activities
bind them closely to the Japanese parent (Japan External Trade Organization, 1993).10 This is a
sensitive issue, for the Japanese are often criticized for heavy-handed control of foreign
operations from offices in Tokyo or Osaka. The general manager of the subsidiary of a major
Tokyo-headquartered electronics firm in Diisseldorf, acknowledging the limits on the freedom of
his office to make its own decisions, went on defensively and rather at odds with the
conventional wisdom to claim that IBM Japan was every bit as tethered to IBM’s Armonk, New
York, offices (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989). So it was unfair, he felt, to single out the Japanese for
criticism on this score.
Given the Japanese reluctance to make flat refusals, there is also some likelihood that
Japanese managers will evoke the excuse of “needing to hear from the head office” in order to
10. Over 60 percent of the more than 1,000 Japanese companies in Germany are involved in sales and
service: only 10 percent do any manufacturing.

put off a decision in hopes that the problem will go away or that the local staff will tire of
pressing the issue. How much autonomy the Japanese overseas subsidiary enjoys is, of course,
tied to the issue of local employee access to higher management positions and decision-making
circles. The Dusseldorf office of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) indicated that
Germans have important postings in Japanese companies, perhaps more so than elsewhere in the
Western world, because of the high esteem in which the Japanese hold the skill and dedication of
German managers and the competitiveness of the German economy as a whole. However, a 1992
publication by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Dusseldorf reports only one company
with a German in the top executive position of the German unit (Japanische Industrie-, 1992; see
Yoshihara, 1989, p. 27). The low incidence of German executives may be attributable in part to
the comparatively late arrival of most of the Japanese companies in Germany. Several Japanese
informants commented that the number of Germans in high-level positions would grow over
time.
The problem of a “glass ceiling” on the upward mobility of Germans in the Japaneseowned firm was cited, not just by middle managers, but also by German workers. The morale of
German middle managers was low, they said, because promotion chances were so limited. For
this reason, a number of such managers were seeking jobs elsewhere. The problems of morale
and turnover among the German middle managers were sufficiently severe that some works
council members said that they would rather have Japanese middle managers.

Conflicting decision-making styles. Though the stereotypes of German decision making as topdown, “command and control” and that of the Japanese as bottom-up, consensus-based are not

wholly apt, some differences along these lines occur (Kieser, 1990; Lincoln and Kalleberg,
1990). Moreover, they caused some tensions within the firms we studied in Dusseldorf.
German complaints about Japanese decision making have a familiar ring
to observers of Japanese companies abroad: “We can’t get a straight answer from the Japanese”;
“the Japanese often give us vague responses that could mean ‘yes’ or ‘no’ ”; “it takes much too
long to get a reply to any questions put to the Japanese”; “we are often told that we must wait on
the Tokyo office for an answer”; and “the Japanese are seldom around to answer our questions.”
The Japanese taste for lengthy face-to-face discussion and painstaking consensusbuilding figures centrally here. Such practices not only have the sometimes intended, sometimes
inadvertent effect of excluding outsiders, they take time, so that the German staff wait in limbo
for decisions to be made and goals set by their Japanese superiors. Learning the not-so- German
virtue (as one German manager characterized it) of patience was deemed absolutely imperative
for success in a Japanese-owned company. Not only did it take longer to make decisions within
the subsidiary, but the need to check with the parent company on many matters of substance
caused further delay.
To hard-driving Western managers, the failure to make quick decisions bespeaks
weakness or hesitation-ergo a failure of leadership. Moreover, because of tight coupling to the
parent firm, the Japanese tendency to build slowly toward consensus is accentuated in the
overseas subsidiary. To a far greater degree than is typical of the regional division of a Western
multinational, managers of the foreign branch of a Japanese company are constrained by close
corporate scrutiny and central headquarters controls.
Yet the German managers we interviewed acknowledged as well the upside of slow and
incremental Japanese decision making: once a decision was finally in place, it was executed with

speed and precision. The German (or American or British) manager who delegated the sole
authority to make a top-down decision without much input from others thereafter faces the
problem of getting colleagues and subordinates on board and informed-no easy task with some
people dragging their feet in irritation at how the decision was made in the first place.
Such contrasts in decison-making style most likely lead to serious tension and conflict in
the relatively uncommon circumstance of an archetypal Japanese manager finding himself
working closely with an equally archetypal German. The small and new subsidiary of a large,
conservative Japanese company was such a case. The Japanese manager was nearing the
mandatory retirement age for this company. Most of his career had been spent in Japan. He was a
quiet, pleasant fellow, given to the usual Japanese graces of humility and politeness. His English
was awkward and hesitant. Half the office staff was Japanese; the remainder was German. With
a sigh, he confided that a recent local hire-a fifty-year old German sales manager-was the bane of
his life. He described this fellow as impatient, aggressive, and a loner; he was bent on controlling
his turf and doing things his way. The German manager refused to nemawashi (networkkonsult)
with colleagues and ignored appeals that he lay out his ideas for others’ scrutiny and input.
Because of the disruptive and confrontational style of the German colleague, the Japanese
general manager dreaded the monthly meetings of the management staff and spoke wistfully of
his impending retirement.
German specialism vs. Japanese generalism. As a prodigious literature testifies, Japanese
companies, though tightly structured in their own way, lack many stock features of Western
formal organization (see, e.g., Clark, 1979; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Employees are hired
as generalists, not specialists,ll and the jobs through which they migrate have shifting boundaries
11. Apart from the broad distinction between technical and administrative staff, new recruits typically
accept a job offer having little information on how the company will utilize their services.

and sparse descriptions. Aside from the precise control of manufacturing tasks typical of the
Japanese shop floor, rules and procedures, while numerous, are characteristically vague,
exhortatory, and stress the virtues of compliance over the penalties for violation (Dore, 1973).
The formal human resource systems that do prevail in the Japanese firm-and there are elaborate
systems governing personnel appraisal, compensation, and advancement (Endo, 1994)-do not
travel well. One reason is the reluctance of Japanese managers to conduct direct appraisals of
foreign employees, denying the local staff clear signals of the company’s expectations for
performance and reward (Pucik, Hanada, and Fifield, 1989). Language and cultural barriers to
easy communication plus a high potential for tension and conflict render such appraisals
unappealing to the average expatriate Japanese manager. Moreover, Japanese-style appraisal is
not used on foreign employees in part because its fixation with commitment, diligence, and skill
formation better assesses long-term potential than recent performance (Endo, 1994). Owing to
higher turnover rates than in Japan, the Japanese company abroad tends not to view local hires as
permanent members (Lifson and Takagi, 1981).
German employees not only share this Western proclivity to define responsibilities and
commitment to the firm in terms of specialized, circumscribed roles; as Japanese managers see it
they take it to extremes. The problem was particularly conspicuous among the technical staff and
skilled tradesmen. The strong German artisan tradition was perceived in quite mixed terms by
North Rhine Japanese managers. On the one hand, their companies prized German labor skills
and technical efficiency. Yet they also reported frustration with the intransigence of German
craftsmen and technicians in refusing duties not encompassed by their job description or formal
competency. The Germans’ stubbornness in doing things their way and “leave-it-to-the-experts”
snobbery drew much negative comment.

Status hierarchies. One of the distinctive formal structures of the Japanese
firm is the standard ranking system that precisely situates employees in a vertical status hierarchy
(Clark, 1979; Dore, 1973; Lincoln and Kalleberg, 1990). Whether the organizational unit is a
firm, government bureau, or educational institution, the titles stay remarkably the same (e.g.,
bucho: department head; jicho: assistant department head; kacho: section head; kakaricho:
assistant section head, etc.). Like military or civil service ranks, they pinpoint status with
extreme precision but only loosely tap role or function, and inside and outside the workplace are
used in preference to personal names as terms of address. The familiar Japanese ritual of
exchanging meishi (business cards) at the outset of a meeting serves to fix the ranks of the
parties, reducing uncertainty as to the appropriate level of politeness or degree of deference.
Germans, too, have a fondness for titles, but German ranks are fewer, are less well
defined, and (as in the U.S.) vary capriciously from one organization to the next (Maurice, Sorge,
and Warner, 1980). A frustrated Japanese manager remarked, “In Germany you can’t tell who is
in charge, or who is senior in rank and has responsibility. You spend a lot of time with a
particular person only to find your time has been wasted because this person has no authority to
do anything.” Another Japanese executive complained that “the Germans need more titles below
the top: you can’t tell their positions from their business cards!” One Japanese manager did
allow, however, that the relative absence of detailed and consistent rankings in German
management culture might promote a sense of responsibility and willingness to take initiative.
While a Japanese manager’s rank communicates his status and assures him the automatic
deference of lower-standing colleagues, the tangible perquisites of management standing-high
pay, private offices, stock options-are less extravagant in the Japanese firm, a fact not eluding the
German managers we surveyed. The German head of personnel in the subsidiary of a major

Japanese trading company did not seem to mind that he enjoyed fewer such perks than he surely
would have at a comparable German firm. The trade-off, owing to the centrality and power of the
personnel function within the Japanese firm (enhanced in his case by the need to deal effectively
with German workers and work rules), was that his clout and standing within the organization
were greater.12 He was the only German on the company’s board of directors and the only one
reporting directly to the president.
The personnel manager in a Japanese company typically enjoys more responsibility and
status than does his counterpart in an American firm. Not only does the personnel office
command direct authority over recruitment, promotion, compensation, training, and other
activities mostly under the control of U.S. line management, but the premium Japanese corporate
culture places on providing jobs and caring for employees also elevates the status of the
personnel department and its management. Yet the Japanese human resource function is spared
many of the burdens that daily occupy the German personnel manager. One German holding this
position in a Japanese corporation observed that, unlike Japan, in Germany continuous and
complex employee negotiations were mandatory on almost every issue. Because of Germany’s
strong unions and elaborate codetermination laws, German workers have more workplace rights
and power than do workers in other industrial countries.
A problem that Japanese companies in North America and the United Kingdom routinely
cite in their dealings with local management hires is the high mobility and low corporate loyalty
typical of managerial careers in these countries. Due in part to a fluid market for their services,

12. Largely because of the responsibilities and authority the codetermination laws confer on German
personnel managers, their status and power within the corporation are generally greater than for their
American counterparts (who typically rank last among management functions), but still relatively low
(see, e.g., Streeck, 1984).

Anglo- American managers stay on the move, switching jobs and companies at short notice to
advance their careers. The long-term ties and confidence demanded by full participation in a
Japanese corporation are difficult to achieve with these people, and, indeed, Japanese managers
commonly justify on these grounds their reluctance to shift control and responsibility to them.
In this respect, our Japanese informants saw the Germans as closer to themselves and
easier to deal with as they were far less prone to change employers than the British or
Americans. As reported by the Financial Times, a recent study by Alfred Kieser of the
University of Mannheim and Rosemary Stewart of Oxford University found that “of the 30
British middle managers in the study, 13 had held their current job for less than two years
(compared with only three in Germany), and another 12 (seven in Germany) for less than four”
(Lorenz, 1994a). Yet while the Japanese are well known for loyalty to one company, within the
organization they are in perpetual motion: changing jobs, departments, and locations as the
company requires. This practice builds cross-functional skills and cooperation, facilitating the
flexible allocation of labor that a permanent employment system demands. The Germans are
likewise less mobile across employers than Americans or British, but, consistent with the
principle of devotion to a specialized craft or competency, they stay put in one function. Kieser
and Templeton report that
“many of the Britons had also moved between unrelated departments or
functional areas. In contrast, all but one of the Germans had stayed in the
same functional area. Twenty of them had occupied their current positions
for five years or more compared with only five of the Britons.”
(Lorenz, 1994a)

Oversocialization in a Japanese business culture. A safe generalization regarding
Japanese overseas subsidiaries is that the longer in place, the greater the independence from the
parent and the greater the influence of the local staff (Cole and Deskins, 1988; Lincoln, Olson,
and Hanada, 1978). A well-managed foreign subsidiary is a hybrid: it melds disparate business
cultures and organizational styles into a seamless whole. Yet for Japanese companies with the
longest tenures abroad, a curious phenomenon occurs (Lifson and Takagi, 1981). Through
selection and socialization, the company assembles a core of veteran local employees who make
their peace with a traditional Japanese management regime and resign themselves to relatively
unchallenging roles within it. With a shift in corporate policy to some decoupling of the foreign
branch, more reliance on locals, and an aggressive, entrepreneurial culture, this old guard puts up
resistance.
Moreover, with the addition of younger cohorts of aggressive, ambitious local hires
unsteeped in the traditional culture, problems of inequity arise. The company wants to reward the
newcomers at a level appropriate to their skill and drive, but it fears the morale problems of a
two-tiered reward structure. This pattern seems particularly a problem for the Japanese Trading
Companies (sogo shosha), which typically have conservative Japanese business cultures and
long histories abroad but whose Japan-based trade is fast diminishing. They are under pressure to
position themselves as flexible purveyors of a wide spectrum of business services. Moreover, the
parent in Japan is remaking itself as a more agile and global competitor, a shift best represented
by the appointment of the highly westernized and cosmopolitan Minoru “Ben” Makihara to the
Presidency of Mitsubishi Corporation, the trading company and flagship corporation of the
Mitsubishi group. These changes in corporate strategy and culture have meant more
responsibility and greater opportunity for a new breed of local manager, but at the same time

resistance from and tension with the local old-timers who, as one German manager put it, are
schooled in outmoded Japanese ways: slow and plodding with automatic careers, risk-averse, and
incapable of clear and quick decisions.

German managers as mediators. Much of the role played by high-level local managers
in Japanese-owned companies is one of interfacing between the Japanese management team and
lower-level local hires. Several German managers who felt they were coping with this juggling
act cited their role in devising formal management systems that would simultaneously satisfy the
German need for structure yet accommodate the Japanese demand for flexibility. The electronics
firm marketing manager was instituting a Management by Objectives (MBO) program for
personnel appraisal, which he viewed as less rigid and detailed than one he had known at a
comparable U.S. company but was nonetheless a quantum leap in formalization over the
subsidiary’s prior management practice. The trading company personnel manager was in the
process of installing a Hay Associates system of job analysis and evaluation. The Japanese had
been reluctant to impose this much structure on the organization but after a good deal of
lobbying he had won their mandate to proceed.
Yet despite their efforts to install some German-style structure within the amorphous
management culture of the Japanese firm, the German managers acknowledged the merits of the
Japanese approach. One put it thus: “A German worker can do anything provided he has a
checklist. The Japanese say they can do anything without the book. The advantage of the
Japanese approach is that, if a problem comes up that is not in the book, the Japanese will try to
do something.”

Mentoring ties us a bridging device. If the local staff are numerous and have long tenure
in the Japanese transplant firm, they are more likely to be patient with, adjust to, and learn from
the Japanese. Pucik, Hanada, and Fifield’s (1989) survey of American managers in the U.S.
subsidiaries of Japanese firms found that the most effective route to influence and inclusion in
the ruling circle of a Japanese subsidiary was through a mentoring partnership with a Japanese
manager. This recalls sempai-kohai relations in Japan where a senior employee paternalistically
takes a younger person under his wing (on-giri kankei) and schools him in the ways of the
company.
Several German executives in North Rhine companies had made such mentoring ties the
vehicle for their ascent in the organization. The German general manager of the German division
of a large Japanese shipping company described his successful partnership with the two senior
Japanese managers as a “triumvirate.” He had been to Japan, studied Japanese management, and
had adopted that diffuse and interactive style as his own. Germans, he and others noted, were
accustomed to direct orders and fixed procedures. He had come to respect what he saw as the
Japanese approach of setting targets and encouraging people to find their own paths to achieving
them. In addition, he had learned the Japanese virtue of patience and had matched his Japanese
colleagues in working late, drinking hard, and otherwise demonstrating himself a dedicated
manager in the conventional Japanese sense.
Still, this manager confided doubts that he would ever penetrate the highest precincts of
his company, though should he stay long enough he thought he might make it to the second
level. He was fortunate, he felt, in that the Japanese parent firm, while practicing like other
Japanese multinationals a good deal of “management by fax machine,” was superior to most in

the autonomy it gave the German branch, so that his efforts to cultivate ties and gain respect
were paying off in real influence.
Another case of partnership was the relation between the German head of marketing and
the Japanese general manager at the Dusseldorf headquarters of a large Japanese electronics
concern. Again the German manager (who had spent ten years in the U.S.) had made a successful
transition to a Japanese management style. Much of his influence and that of other Germans in
this office, however, he owed to his Japanese partner who, in contrast to the previous general
manager (under whose regime decision making was almost exclusively the province of the
Japanese), was an urbane, articulate (in English), and assertive leader committed to shifting
responsibility to local people. He nonetheless acknowledged that on most questions of substance
he still sought permission from Tokyo.

Labor, Unions, and Codetermination
Working hours. While the average Japanese employee puts in 2,150 hours per year, and
Americans work around 1,950 hours, the typical German takes it comparatively easy at 1,600
hours a year. Moreover, in contrast with the much-marveled-at Japanese tendency to give up
vacation time for the sake of the firm, Germans take their paid holidays for granted, and by
American standards they are numerous indeed. Some absenteeism owing to “illness” on Fridays,
Mondays, and around holidays was also noted by our Japanese informants. Low working hours
do not, on the other hand, convert into lower annual pay: in 1990, 88 percent of the German GNP
went to workers, as opposed to 80 percent in the United States and 69 percent in Japan.
With high German wages and complex work rules, Japanese companies view German
working hours as a significant cost to investment in Germany, and it is a factor in the limited

commitment they have made to large scale manufacturing there. Yet they did not seem to view it
as an unalloyed liability. First, Germans in executive positions in Japanese companies, they said,
by and large matched the Japanese in work commitment, toiling without complaint evenings,
weekends, and holidays. Second, as noted, the Japanese praised the efficiency and diligence of
Germans on the job, even over the Japanese white-collar staff. l3 They found German employees
were better trained, more precise and accurate in their work, and generally more productive than
other nationalities. As one Japanese manager put it, “German workers may cost more, but their
reputation for quality and skill means that we can more easily sell goods to other countries.” Or,
“Germans may work fewer hours, but when they work their concentration is beautiful.” Because
of the skill and efficiency of German labor, a JETRO official told us, Japanese companies could
live with workrule rigidities and high labor costs. Moreover, Japanese firms were following with
keen interest the debates in Europe over the need for greater labor flexibility to bring down high
unemployment rates (at the time averaging above 10-12% in North Rhine-Westphalia) and
increase European competitiveness.

The views of union officials and works councils. In several hours of interviews with union
and works council officials we examined the problems of German rank-and-file workers in

managers and workers, and how workers are treated, are any worse or better when compared to
similar German companies?” The routine answer was, overall, that Japanese corporations are
neither better nor worse than German firms in their treatment of German workers. This, of
course, is not to say that the Japanese firms were problem-free-only that the German employers
were no better.
The history of Japanese business in the United States and United Kingdom shows that
Japanese companies have been more successful with bluecollar workers than with white-collar
and professional people (Florida and Kenney, 1992; Lincoln, 1990; White and Trevor, 1983).
The Japanese workplace traditions of shop-floor participation and long-term employment are
often welcomed by blue-collar workers who find in these policies a sense of security and
partnership in the operations of the firm. The problems of white-collar employees in adapting to
the Japanese-managed company have been noted: barriers to communication, decision making,
and promotion that impede participation on an equal footing
We interviewed works council members from companies employing mostly white-collar
workers as well as those with predominantly bluecollar workers. Many had been with German
companies prior to joining the Japanese firm. Rarely did these workers indicate they had more
problems with the Japanese company. Indeed, they favored it: “Japanese companies give you
more time to learn things”; “you can make mistakes in Japanese companies and they have more
patience with you”; and “they seem more concerned about their workers here.”
Union leaders cited the following problems faced by workers in Japanese
transplants: Managers push additional working hours on employees without extra compensation;
tariffs (wage agreements) are sometimes violated by assigning a lower classification than an

employee’s job justifies; not all issues that the laws require are taken before the works council.
The union officials noted, however, that German employers engaged in similar actions.
Yet other complaints were peculiar to the Japanese firms. There were the familiar
problems of communication (“We don’t always get enough information from the Japanese
staff about how to do our job”; “instructions are often written in English which most of our
workers can’t read”). That communication in English should prove a greater hurdle for German
bluecollar workers than for their better educated white-collar colleagues comes as no surprise.
Workers also complained that the Japanese kept their distance from workers and the works
councils and that they were less able or willing to talk openly about problems. When concrete
personnel problems did materialize, moreover, they were aggravated by the language barrier.
There were also concerns that negotiations between management and works councils
took longer in the Japanese firms. This is again attributable to the Japanese penchant for long
predecision discussion and analysis. Because of their strong dependence on the overseas parent
firm, the Japanese management often lack the independent authority to negotiate local labor
agreements that German or American employers possess.
Some of these issues are traceable to Japanese managers’ general naïveté regarding the
structure and functioning of German works councils and codetermination laws. One union leader
commented that “Japanese managers have much less experience dealing openly with workers’
representatives through a works council. They do not fully understand what German
codetermination laws require. ” Japanese companies were often less resistant initially than were
German employers to forming works councils when the law required it. But once the council was
in place and operational and the Japanese began to realize its implications, their cooperation with
the process was less than complete.

In general, however, Japanese subsidiaries in Germany have no choice but to comply
with German labor norms. As the Director of JETRO in Dusseldorf commented, “If Japanese
managers work within the rules established by union and management, there is no problem.”
When a Japanese corporation sets up operations in the United States and hires American
employees, a range of labor issues is thrown open for negotiation and dispute: pay, working
hours, vacations, work rules, and union representation are all on the table. Owing to weak
American unions and the competition among states and localities to provide an attractive
“business climate,” the Japanese company is disposed to drive a hard bargain. The contrast with
Germany is sharp: codetermination laws and union rules go with the territory. The reputations
Japanese firms have elsewhere acquired as antiunion, low-wage employers who manage “by
stress” have no chance of forming (Milkman, 1991).
This is not to say the Japanese are happy with German labor rules. Japanese managers
complained of the burden of regulations demanding maternity leave, working-hour restrictions,
long vacations, and the conduct of union and works council business on company time. With an
air of exasperation, personnel managers in two such firms presented us with impressively long
lists of employees currently on some type of legally mandated leave.
While information sharing with employees and unions through joint consultation
committees (roshi kyogi-kai) and collective bargaining is established practice in Japan, such
cooperative arrangements are much less formally codified and legally sanctioned than German
codetermination laws require. Moreover, the relative weakness and dependence of Japanese
enterprise unions guarantee the company considerable discretion and control in these exchanges.
German works councils and unions, protected by broad legal safeguards against arbitrary
management actions and rights to worker involvement in participation in decision making and

governance, represent labor participation of a sort unfamiliar to and not altogether to the liking of
the Japanese management.
Yet one feature of German industrial relations that was praised by Japanese and German
managers alike is that the company contends with but a single highly unified labor association.
This it has in common with the Japanese enterprise union system. A representative of the
Associations of German Employers stated: “As soon as you get splinter groups in the plant, you
get unrest as well. We would rather deal with one union, with a unified works council. A single,
unified opponent is more reliable and trustworthy [verlasslich];m ore than one faction fosters
competition among them as each tries to outdo the other. We would rather have a single strong
and self-confident union to work with.”

Conclusions
It is not uncommon to attribute the conflict and misunderstandings that materialize
between an expatriate management team and their local hires either to cultural miscues
(including language) or to simple prejudice and discrimination. Culture, in the sense of deeprooted societal values and skills, does shape relations between local and rotation employees in
Japanese subsidiaries abroad. What could be more fundamentally cultural or more productive of
short-term pique and smoldering long-term ill will than the politeness/rudeness or
bluntness/vagueness rifts cited by the Japanese and Germans in our survey? Yet most of the
obstacles to smooth cross-nationality relations in the Dusseldorf Japanese firms arose less from
culture per se than from entrenched organizational habits-e.g., top-down and segmented vs.
inclusive and consensus decision making; the specialist-generalist split over job roles; or the
tension between explicit and implicit structures of performance appraisal. Even the tight controls

that Tokyo or Osaka offices impose on foreign subsidiaries is less, it seems to us, a function of
some culturally grounded Japanese distrust of gaijin managers than of the seamless hierarchical
unity of the typical Japanese firm. It is also due to low reliance on the accounting controls that
Western transnationals widely use to manage their foreign subsidiaries.
Modes of organizing may themselves have cultural roots, of course, but culture is not the
only reason for the permanence and legitimacy that explain the often visceral resistance to
attempts to modify them. Japanese multinational corporations face a dilemma: the unique and
traditional management practices that by and large have served them well do not easily
accommodate outsiders in the organization, particularly at the highest levels of leadership.
Moreover, the very distinctiveness of such forms sets the stage for conflict with alternative
models when the Japanese firm goes abroad.
German organization with its own distinctive structure of authority and expertise
complemented by works councils and codetermination laws has some features in common with
the Japanese model but much of it is markedly different. The cultural diversity, weak unions, and
political fragmentation of the United States allow the Japanese firm more leeway to apply its
standard practice to a local workforce and management team.14 Moreover, while Japanese
management style may strike Americans as exotic, Americans are generally quicker than the
Germans to adjust to it. Weaker labor institutions are one reason. Another is that “American”
organizational modes span more variation and shift more often with the winds of management
fashion (e.g., the current passion for “reengineering”). Germany, like Japan, is different. It is a
tight, dense, and in some ways closed cultural and social system that resists foreign or novel
14. Of course, it is not only the Japanese who must adapt to a complex and constraining institutional
environment when they set up business in Germany. A recent article in the Washington Post colorfully
describes the “perils U.S. firms encounter when they try to do business in a country where custom,
regulation and social nuance can create many a sticky wicket. . . . it doesn’t take long to discover that
when working here there is a right way, a wrong way-and a German way” (Atkinson, 1994)

elements. The recessionary German economy and other symptoms of faltering German
competitiveness have recently tested that resistance, making German managers and officials
more receptive particularly to Japanese but also to American methods. Yet faith in the
established order runs deep. Indeed, as the economy pulls out of recession, sentiment is growing
that German institutions have been vindicated, thus weakening the impetus for change
(Goodhart, 1994).
What do the diversity of style and practice and the occasional tensions and
miscommunication within Japanese firms in Germany imply for the performance and
effectiveness of these organizations? It is noteworthy that the Japanese appeared to have no
strategic plan for managing their internal divisions. The adjustments we saw taking place (e.g.,
the mentoring partnerships and compromise personnel systems) seemed ad hoc and evolutionary,
not proactively designed by the Japanese team. Indeed, in the cases we cite, it appeared that
German managers in key positions had contrived the solutions and persuaded the Japanese to go
along. We may have been witnessing, of course, another instance of Japanese decision making:
subordinates (in this case, Germans) being nudged by Japanese superiors to take the initiative on
issues to which the company was committed all along.
Yet the business performance of the organizations we studied did not seem to be
suffering from their internal nationality divisions and the problems these posed for
communication and cooperation. Despite the recessionary economy and the numerous
institutional obstacles to the conduct of business in Europe, our informants were generally
optimistic: their companies were competitive and with some exceptions were meeting corporate
goals. A reason for their success, we suspect, is that, despite the uncertainties and tensions
brought on by the “culture gap,” they were staffed by highly skilled and able people going about

their tasks and responsibilities in a competent and diligent, if not altogether unified, way. The
weakened German economy had given these companies their pick of German white-collar and
blue-collar labor, and the Japanese, of course, performed their jobs with customary fervor. In the
last analysis, a talented workforce-and the Germans and Japanese arguably have the best in the
world-can offset a host of organizational ills.

REFERENCES
Atkinson, Rick. 1994. “Germany’s Maze of Business Regulation Challenges U.S. Companies.”
WashBartlett, Christopher A,, and Sumantra Ghoshal. 1989. Managing across Borders: The
Transnational
Clark, Rodney. 1979. The Japanese Company. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Cole, Robert E., and Donald R. Deskins, Jr. 1988. “Racial Factors in the Employment Patterns of
Japanese Auto Firms in America.” California Management Review 31:9-22.
Dore, Ronald. 1973. British Factory, Japanese Factory. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Endo, Koshi. 1994. “Satei (Personnel Assessment) and Interworker Competition in Japanese
Firms.” Industrial Relations 33:70-82.
Florida, Richard, and Martin Kenney. 1992. Beyond Mass Production. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Goodhart, David. 1994. “There’s Still Life in the Old Model: Despite Economic Woes,
Germany’s Social Market System Has Proved Resilient and Flexible.” Financial Times,
12 April.
Japan External Trade Organization (Nihon Boeki Shinko-kai). 1993. Zaio Nikkei Kigyo (Seizogyo) no Keiei Jitai:Dai Kyu-kai Jitai Chosa Hokoku (The Management Practices of
Japanese-Affiliated Manufacturing Firms in Western Europe). Tokyo: JETRO. ington
Post, 22 May. Solution. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Japanische Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Dusselorf. 1992. Kaiin Meihaku.
Kerbo, Harold R., Elke Wittenhagen, and Keiko Nakao. 1994a. “Japanische Unternehmen in
Deutsch: Unternehmenstruktur und Arbeitsverhaltnis.” Gelsenkirchen: Veroffentlichungsliste
Des Instituts Arbeit Und Technik.
-. 1994b. “Japanese Transplant Corporations, Foreign Employees, and the German
Economy: A Comparative Analysis of Germany and the United States.” Duisburger
Bettrage zur Sociologischen Forschung. Duisburg, Germany.
Kieser, Alfred. 1990. “Organisational Culture.” In Handbook of German Business
Management, edited by Erwin Grochla and E. Gaugler, pp. 1576-81. Berlin: SpringerVerlag.
Lifson, Thomas B., and H. Takagi. 1981. “Mitsubishi Corporation (B): Americanization at
MIC.” Case No. 9-482-051. Boston: Harvard Business School.

Lincoln, James R. 1990. “Japanese Management in the U.S.: A Qualified Success.” JAMA
Forum: A Quarterly Journal on International Trade and Automotive Issues 8: 14-18.
Lincoln, James R., and Arne L. Kalleberg. 1990. Culture, Control, and Commitment: A Study
of Work Organization and Work Attitudes in the U.S. and Japan. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lincoln, James R., Jon Olson, and Mitsuyo Hanada. 1978. “Cultural Effects on Organizational
Structure: Japanese Firms in the U.S.” American Sociological Review 43:829-47.
Lorenz, Christopher. 1994a. “Styles of Execution.” Financial Times, 23 February.
-. 1994b. “Does Nationality Really Matter?” Financial Times, 13 April.
Maurice, Marc, Arndt Sorge, and Malcolm Warner. 1980. “Societal Differences in Organizing
Manufacturing Units: A Comparison of France, West Germany, and Great Britain.”
Organisation Studies 159-86.
Milkman, Ruth. 1991. Japan’s California Factories: Labor Relations and Economic
Globalization. Los Angeles: IILR Monograph and Research Series, UCLA.
Morita, Akio, and Shintaro Ishihara. 1989. NO to ieru Nihon (The Japan that Can Say NO).
Tokyo:
Nelson, Mark M. 1993. “Germany’s Service Sector Is Booming in Overdue Restructuring of
EconOliver, Nick and Barry Wilkinson. 1990. The Japanization of Britain. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ozawa, Ichiro. 1994. Blueprint for a New Japan. Tokyo: Kodansha.
Pascale, Richard Tanner, and Anthony G. Athos. 1981. The Art of Japanese Management:
Applications for American Executives. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Pucik, Vladimir, Mitsuyo Hanada, and George Fifield. 1989. Management Culture and the
Effectiveness of Local Executives in Japanese-Owned US. Corporations. Tokyo: Egon
Zehnder International.
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1984. “Guaranteed Employment, Flexible Manpower Use, and Cooperative
Manpower Management: A Trend towards Convergence?” In Industrial Relations in
Transition: The Cases of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, edited by Tokunaga
Shigeyoshi and Joachim Bergmann, pp. 81-116. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Wall Street Journal. 1989. “Labor Letter: Why Do Japanese Bosses Share Blame while
Americans Hang Tough?” 4 April, p. 1.
White, Michael, and Malcolm Trevor. 1983. Under Japanese Management. London: Heinemann.
Yoshihara, Hideki. 1989. “The Bright and the Dark Sides of Japanese Management Overseas.”
In Japanese and European Management: Their International Adaptability, edited by
Kazuo Shibagaki, Malcolm Trevor, and Tetsuo Abo, pp. 18-30. Tokyo: University of
Tokyo Press. Kobunsha. omy.” Wall Street Journal, 10 May, p. 1.

